




This article focuses on the consequences of the crisis for
international migration. The media have reported extensively on
the visible effects on new migration, migrant employment,
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But these are short-term effects, and much of
the evidence so far is fragmentary or anecdotal.
What are the long-term effects likely to be: on
migratory flows, on the migrants themselves,
and on the communities of origin and destina-
tion? To some extent we can only speculate on
these matters, but we can learn a lot by looking
at the experience of past economic crises. The
key question is whether the current situation is
a mere interruption in global growth patterns
or, on the contrary, may actually indicate major
structural changes to come?1
Immediate effects
What started as a credit crunch in reaction
to years of uncontrolled lending and inflated
prices in the US housing market very rapidly
turned into a general economic crisis affecting
the whole world – including the new industrial
economies which many had thought insulated
from the problems of North America and
Western Europe. The crisis has vividly demon-
strated the interdependence of the globalised
economy. This applies especially to the emerg-
ing global markets for labour of all skill levels.
The crisis has vividly demonstrated
the interdependence of the globalised
economy. This applies especially to
the emerging global markets for labour
of all skill levels.
Recruitment of migrant workers has proved
highly sensitive to the recession. At the same
time, control of borders by nation-states – long
seen as a last vestige of sovereignty in a world
dominated by cross-border markets and multi-
national corporations – has reasserted itself. It
is one way in which governments can convince
their voters that they are doing something to
alleviate the crisis.
Some of the short-term effects of the crisis
mentioned in media reports include:
Return migration of some migrant workers to
their homelands as a reaction to unemploy-
ment or lower earnings.
Reduced levels of migration from origin
countries to destination countries.
Attempts by governments to persuade or
force unemployed migrant workers to leave.
Especially large declines in irregular migra-
tion, which appears to be very sensitive to
availability of jobs.
Reduced remittances from migrants to their
home communities, leading to possible hardship
in communities dependent on such transfers.
Increased hostility to migrants among majority
populations.
One of the most pressing problems is
growing unemployment. This has
particularly affected the construction,
manufacturing and services branches
in which migrant workers are highly
represented.
One of the most pressing problems is growing
unemployment. This has particularly affected
the construction, manufacturing and services
branches in which migrant workers are highly
represented. In the USA the unemployment
rate in construction jumped from 9.4 to 15.3 per
cent in the year ending December 2008. In
Spain, unemployment rose from 8 per cent in
2007 to almost 14 per cent by early 2009, but to
over 20 per cent for non-European Union
migrants. The United Arab Emirates are plan-
ning to lay off up to 4 per cent of the construc-
tion-related workforce in 2009, including
highly-skilled employees such as managers and
analysts. In China’s manufacturing sector an
estimated 10 million workers have lost their
jobs – many of them rural-urban migrants. In
financial and travel-related services, some high
skilled migrants are finding it difficult to keep
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their jobs and are opting to return home, while
others feel that they must stay in order to send
remittances to their families. Staff cuts are also
happening in restaurants and hotels, although
the effects may be less visible than elsewhere,
due to the frequently short-term nature of
catering employment.
Higher unemployment and worker
layoffs are generating resentment
among some native workers, who
blame migrant workers for taking jobs.
Higher unemployment and worker layoffs are
generating resentment among some native
workers, who blame migrant workers for taking
jobs. The politically explosive nature of this
issue was demonstrated by an unofficial strike
of building workers at the Lindsey oil refinery
site in Lincolnshire, England in January-February
2009. The workers picketed the site in protest at
the granting of a building contract to an Italian
firm, which brought its own workers from Italy
and Portugal to do the job. By the third day of
the strike, workers at many projects across Eng-
land and Scotland had joined the protest. They
demanded preferential treatment for British
workers, echoing a promise by Prime Minister
Gordon Brown of «British jobs for British work-
ers». Under EU law, companies and workers
from any member state have the right to com-
pete for jobs. The trade unions and the Labour
Government refused to support the strike, but
felt very threatened by this spontaneous mobil-
isation, and helped to broker a behind-the-
scenes compromise, to make sure more British
builders got jobs on large projects.
Political responses
The Lincolnshire dispute brought together ele-
ments of protectionism and xenophobia, which
are likely to increase as the crisis affects
increasing segments of local populations. Social
and educational government programmes are
essential to prevent migrants from becoming
scapegoats for the crisis and to stop potential
conflicts and violence. In times of crisis
migrants need protection against exploitation,
and undocumented migrants are in a particu-
larly vulnerable position. Governments should
ensure that welfare and social services are
accessible to all workers and that skill training
programmes are made available to migrant and
native workers alike.
Yet governments in many destination countries
do just the opposite: they use anti-immigration
policies as a way of diverting popular anger about
unemployment and falling incomes. During the
Great Depression and the 1973 Oil Crisis, the
US and European governments used migrants
as «safety valves» to reduce unemployment and
free up jobs for citizens. Many governments
today are unveiling short-term return pro-
grammes to restrict entries and to persuade or
even force migrants to return to their country
of origin.
Many governments are unveiling
short-term return programmes to
restrict entries and to persuade or
even force migrants to return to their
country of origin.
Unable to prevent mobility within the EU, the
British Government has tightened up the entry
criteria under its Points System, to reduce the
number of non-EU entrants – but above all to
convince the public that it was acting to protect
British workers. The Spanish government has
offered financial incentives for migrants to
return to their origin country, but so far this
programme has largely failed to win migrant
participation, because those who accept it have
to turn in their work and residence cards to the
authorities, and fear that they will not be able
to return later on, when the economy recovers.
Enforced return and recruitment stops are not
confined to Europe. Taiwan repatriated 2000
 Filipino workers as soon as the crisis began.
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The South Korean Ministry of Labour decided
to reduce the number of work permits to 34,000
for the whole of 2009, about one third of last
year’s number. The Thai government
announced in January 2009 that it would not
renew migrants’ registrations for the year, hoping
that they would return to their origin country
and make jobs available to Thais. The Malaysian
government halted entries of migrant workers
and ordered employers to lay off migrant work-
ers first, hoping that they would return to their
country of origin.
Yet history has shown the limitations of this
approach: after the 1973 Oil Crisis, European
governments found that local workers would
not take «migrant jobs», even if the alternative
was unemployment. Economies had become
structurally dependent on migrant workers. Simi-
larly, in the1997-1999 Asian financial crisis,
several governments introduced policies of
national labour preference and sought to expel
migrants – especially undocumented workers.
However, employers (for instance in the
Malaysian plantation industry or Thai fisheries)
quickly discovered that many nationals were
unwilling to take these jobs, even in a recession.
Such employers demanded – and secured –
a suspension of expulsion policies.
One result of the neo-liberal economic
policies of the last 30 years has been
the emergence of «unwanted» jobs
and informal labour markets that
requires cheap unskilled labour –
mainly provided by migrants.
Destination-country governments seem likely
to persist with policies of return and expulsion, as
well as stricter barriers to entry. These policies
are politically popular, but their economic
rationality and sustainability is dubious. One
result of the neo-liberal economic policies 
of the last 30 years has been growing inequal-
ity, even within the richest countries, and the
emergence of «unwanted» jobs and informal
labour markets that requires cheap unskilled
labour – mainly provided by migrants. This
need may well persist despite the crisis – as
happened after 1973.
On the other hand, it is possible that the
 current economic crisis may be so deep and
widespread that it will differ from the past.
There are signs that the global decline in job
opportunities is leading to a decline in irregular
migration. For instance undocumented Mexico-
US migration seems to have fallen in response
to the sharp cuts in residential construction. In
addition, there is evidence that illegal migration
to the European Union as well as the internal
EU flow is cyclical even without government
interventions.
Migrants’ dilemmas
Government migration policies often fail
because they ignore social factors and forget
that migrants are not just economic actors who
follow income maximisation motives. Migrants
will not necessarily return to their country of
origin in a recession. If they have long residence
and strong family ties, have invested in educa-
tion and housing, and can benefit from welfare
payments, then they will be likely to endure
through the crisis rather than take the risk of
returning to the origin country.
If migrants have long residence
and strong family ties, have
invested in education and
housing, and can benefit from
welfare payments, then they will
be likely to endure through the
crisis rather than take the risk of
returning to the origin country.
Even for vulnerable undocumented migrants,
leaving the country might not be a viable solu-
tion in light of the strengthening of security
and border enforcement, which would prevent
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return to the destination country at a later
stage. Thus the building of a wall along the US-
Mexican border seems to have turned tempo-
rary labour migration into permanent
settlement, rather than stopping irregular
migration.
Where migrants and their families have to scrape
together money to pay high fees to people-
smugglers or job-agents, it is extremely hard for
them to go home during the crisis. The whole
family may be in debt, and repayment is crucial,
which leads migrants to find an alternative job –
however exploitative – rather than return home.
It is also important to realise that many migrants
come through family reunification – this is in fact
the largest migration category in many countries.
Such entries are not likely to be significantly
affected by the crisis: migrants who have gone
through a lengthy visa application process will
not forego the opportunity to migrate, even if the
visa comes through in a crisis period. 
The ability to send home remittance to their
families is crucial to many migrants. After years
of significant growth, the World Bank now
 predicts that remittances will stagnate or even
decline by up to 6 per cent in 2009. This could
lead to significant hardship to origin communi-
ties. However, even here, migrants do not always
follow the expectation of economic rationalism:
South Korean overseas communities have
increased their transfers and investments to the
Korean economy through a «Buy Korean» cam-
paign. This behaviour was also recorded also
during the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis, when
Korean communities overseas mobilised their
capital, purchased Korean goods and deposited
their capital in Korean banks.
This demonstrates the migrants’ ability to mobilise
in support of their country. Similarly, many
migrants take emotional responsibility for their
family’s needs, and may go to great lengths to
ensure that they can continue sending money
home. For this reason, the World Bank predicts
that many migrants will not return home, even
if the situation continues to deteriorate.
Refugees and asylum
Effects on forced migration may be different
from those on voluntary migration. The interna-
tional protection regime created by the 1951
Geneva Refugee Convention is meant to lift
them above the market forces that drive labour
migration. It therefore seems likely that refugee
flows will not be reduced as a result of the
changing economic forces. However, the eco-
nomic crisis may affect refugees through receiv-
ing states’ restrictive policy and legal measures.
In fact, since the 1990s, increasingly tight entry
rules have made it extremely hard for asylum
seekers to come to developed countries to make
asylum claims. There has been a concerted attack
on participants in «mixed flows», in which
refugees and economic migrants are hard to
distinguish, because their reasons for fleeing
are tied simultaneously to conflict and persecu-
tion, and to lack of development and economic
marginalisation. The trend towards greater
restrictiveness seems likely to continue.
Many experts think that countries of
origin of refugees and migrants will
not be spared by the economic crisis
because of exports reduction.
At the same time the number of people in need
of protection is likely to increase. The economic
crisis is likely to mean reduced foreign invest-
ments and severe reductions in development
aid. This could in turn create the conditions for
increased conflicts in regions that already have
weak governments and high poverty levels.
The most vulnerable segments of the popula-
tion are likely to suffer from the lack of support
of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion programmes, increasing even further their
vulnerability.
Many experts think that countries of origin of
refugees and migrants will not be spared by the
economic crisis and the impact might be very
severe, leading to widespread impoverishment
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in vulnerable countries. South America, South
Asia and China have already experienced
increases in unemployment due to reduced
exports. This situation is likely to exacerbate
political and social tensions in many developing
countries, as elites try to maintain their domi-
nance, while marginal segments of the population
seek to secure their livelihoods. The result may
be greater conflict and greater numbers of
forcibly displaced people. However, the effects
of such displacements will be felt much more
strongly within vulnerable countries and the
regions around them, rather than in the North.
Historical lessons
It is too early to predict the long-term effects of
the current crisis on migration. However, to
understand the potential impacts, it is useful to
look at history. The world economic crisis of the
1930s led to a massive decline in international
labour migration, and to return (sometimes
compulsory) of many migrants from countries
like the USA and France. However, some of the
decline was actually the result of restrictive
policies adopted during and after WWI. For
instance in the USA, the «nativist movement»
campaigned against immigration, and major
restrictions were introduced in the early 1920s.
In any case, many migrants did not return
home in the 1930s, but settled and became
members of the permanent population of
receiving countries.
The recession following the Oil Crisis of 1973
(when OPEC states rapidly increased oil prices)
had enormous consequences for migration,
but hardly anyone predicted them. «Guest-
worker migration» ended in Europe, and
processes of family reunion and permanent set-
tlement started, leading to the formation of
new ethnic minorities. Large corporations
developed strategies of capital export and a
«new international division of labour», which
led to the emergence of new industrial centres
especially in Asia and Latin America – and in
the long run to new flows of labour migration.
The recycling of petro-dollars was the basis for
an economic boom in oil states.
In some cases (such as Dubai and other Gulf
states) this led to long-term economic develop-
ment; in others – like Nigeria – the oil profits
were dissipated in corruption and luxury con-
sumption by the elite, with few long-term ben-
efits. All in all, the 1973 crisis was a major
turning point in global migration.
Employers quickly discovered that
many nationals were unwilling to take
on «migrant jobs», even in a
recession.
The effects of the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis
were more modest. Several governments intro-
duced policies of national labour preference
and sought to expel migrants – especially
undocumented workers. In some cases,
migrants were blamed for unemployment and
other social ills – like epidemics and criminality.
However, employers quickly discovered that
many nationals were unwilling to take on
«migrant jobs», even in a recession. In any case,
the interruption to economic growth in Asia
was only short-lived – after 1999 migration
grew again and reached new heights.
A new global economy?
The lesson from these examples is that the
effects of economic downturns on migration
are complex and hard to predict. Is the current
crisis more like that of the 1930s, post-1973 or
1997-99 in Asia? The answer is that it has its
own unique features and cannot easily be
compared with any of them. Just because the
end of the Cold War opened the way to a single
global economy, the 2008 Crash has affected the
whole world in an almost unprecedented way.
This time it is the very core of the market sys-
tem that is questioned. But what does seem
clear is that it will not simply be «business as
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usual» in few years time: the neo-liberal glob-
alisation model appears to have run its course.
It is mistaken to believe that migrants
will serve as a safety valve for
developed economies, by providing
labour in times of expansion and going
away in recession.
The current crisis is likely to have deep-reaching
effects that we cannot foresee. It is mistaken to
believe that migrants will serve as a safety valve
for developed economies, by providing labour
in times of expansion and going away in reces-
sion. When economic conditions get bad in
rich countries they may be even worse in
poorer origin countries. Moreover, migrants are
social beings, who put down roots and form
relationships in new countries. At times of reces -
sion, the motivation to migrate may be even
higher than before, and remittances may prove
a resilient form of international transfer.
Finally, global economic inequality and the
demographic imbalances between the ageing
populations of the North and the large cohorts
of working age persons in the South will
remain important factors in generating future
migration.
In the long run, the fundamental causes of
migration are not likely to change. The ageing
societies of the North will require increasing
numbers of domestic and care workers. Yet if
the configuration of the new, post-crisis global
economy is radically different from the past, we
might see new patterns of migration, new
sending and receiving countries and the rise of
a new migration order. New systems of
employment based on recruitment of cheap
labour may emerge. Or – to take a more opti-
mistic view – policy-makers might learn from
the experience of the crisis to establish new
forms of global migration governance, based on
international cooperation and the rule of law.
A_068-075_Castles_2.qxp:núm.2  23/6/09  12:40  Página 74
75paradigmes /  Issue no. 2 / June 2009
STEPHEN CASTLES
DPhil in Sociology at the University of Sussex.
Professor of Migration and Refugee Studies and Director of the International Migration
Institute (IMI) at the University of Oxford.
He taught Sociology and Political Economy at the Fachhochschule Frankfurt am Main
from 1972-85. From 1986 to 2000 he was Professor of Sociology and Director of the
Centre for Multicultural Studies (1986-96) and then Director of the Centre for Asia
Pacific Social Transformation Studies, at the University of Wollongong, Australia.
He helped establish and coordinate the UNESCO-MOST Asia Pacific Migration Research
Network. He has been an advisor to the Australian and British Governments, and has
worked for the ILO, the IOM, the European Union and other international bodies.
He has a specific web page on migration: http://www.age-of-migration.com/
SIMONA VEZZOLI
Simona Vezzoli is a Research Assistant at IMI.
She has a BA in socio-cultural anthropology from the University of California,
Berkeley, and an MA in international policy studies with a specialization in
international development from the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
She has worked for the Migration for the Development in Africa (MIDA) project at the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Rome.
Her research interests include migration policy and governance; African diaspora
communities; and return and reintegration of migrants in their communities of origin.
Notes
1. This article is largely based on a range of media reports as well as articles contributed by a number of colleagues to a «virtual
symposium» on migration and the global financial crisis. This material and references to relevant reports are to be found on the com-
panion website of the book: The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World by Stephen Castles and Mark
J. Miller at: www.age-of-migration.com. Simona Vezzoli has been responsible for compiling the material.
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